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Abstract
End-to-end task-oriented dialog models have achieved
promising performance on collaborative tasks where users
willingly coordinate with the system to complete a given
task. While in non-collaborative settings, for example, ne-
gotiation and persuasion, users and systems do not share a
common goal. As a result, compared to collaborate tasks,
people use social content to build rapport and trust in these
non-collaborative settings in order to advance their goals.
To handle social content, we introduce a hierarchical in-
tent annotation scheme, which can be generalized to differ-
ent non-collaborative dialog tasks. Building upon Transfer-
Transfo (Wolf et al. 2019), we propose an end-to-end neu-
ral network model to generate diverse coherent responses.
Our model utilizes intent and semantic slots as the inter-
mediate sentence representation to guide the generation pro-
cess. In addition, we design a filter to select appropriate re-
sponses based on whether these intermediate representations
fit the designed task and conversation constraints. Our non-
collaborative dialog model guides users to complete the task
while simultaneously keeps them engaged. We test our ap-
proach on our newly proposed ANTISCAM dataset and an ex-
isting PERSUASIONFORGOOD dataset. Both automatic and
human evaluations suggest that our model outperforms mul-
tiple baselines in these two non-collaborative tasks.
Introduction
Considerable progress has been made building end-to-end
dialog systems for collaborative tasks in which users coop-
erate with the system to achieve a common goal. Examples
of collaborative tasks include making restaurant reservations
and retrieving bus time-table information. Since users typi-
cally have clear and explicit intentions in collaborative tasks,
existing systems commonly classify user utterances into pre-
defined intents. In contrast, non-collaborative tasks are those
where the users and the system do not strive to achieve
the same goal. Examples of such tasks include deceiving
attackers, persuading users to donate to a cause (Wang et
al. 2019), and negotiating a product price (He et al. 2018;
Cao et al. 2018). In these tasks, users often perform com-
plex actions that are beyond a simple set of pre-defined in-
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tents. In order to reach a common state, the user and the
system need to build rapport and trust which naturally in-
volves off-task content. Previous work did not model off-
task content (He et al. 2018), which may have led to less
optimal results. For example, in the persuasion task (Wang
et al. 2019), users would ask the system “How do you feel
about war?” An example of an on-task system response that
the system could have made is “Do you want to make a do-
nation?”, which sticks to the task but neglects users’ ques-
tion. However, a better response to such an off-task ques-
tion is “War is destructive and pitiless, but you can donate
to help child victims of war.” This response is better, as it
has been found that users are more likely to end the conver-
sation if the system neglects their questions (Yu, Black, and
Rudnicky 2017). Therefore, we need to design a system that
handles both on-task and off-task information appropriately
and in a way that leads back to the system’s goal.
To tackle the issue of incoherent system responses to off-
task content, previous studies have built hybrid systems to
interleave off-task and on-task content. Yu, Black, and Rud-
nicky used a rule-based dialog manager for on-task content
and a neural model for off-task content, and trained a rein-
forcement learning model to select between these two mod-
els based on the dialog context. However, such a method
is difficult to train and struggles to generalize beyond the
movie promotion task they considered. To tackle these prob-
lems, we propose a hierarchical intent annotation scheme
that separates on-task and off-task information in order to
provide detailed supervision. For on-task information, we
directly use task-related intents for representation. Off-task
information, on the other hand, is too general to categorize
into specific intents, so we choose dialog acts that convey
syntax information. These acts, such as “open question” are
general to all tasks.
Previous studies use template-based methods to maintain
sentence coherence. However, rigid templates lead to lim-
ited diversity, causing the user losing engagement. On the
other hand, language generation models can generate di-
verse responses but are bad at being coherent. We propose
Multiple Intents and Semantic Slots Annotation Neural Net-
work (MISSA) to combine the advantages of both template
and generation models and takes advantage from the hier-
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
10
74
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
L]
  2
5 N
ov
 20
19
archical annotation at the same time. MISSA follows the
TransferTransfo framework (Wolf et al. 2019) with three
modifications: (i) We first concurrently predict user’s, sys-
tem’s intents and semantic slots; (ii) We then perform con-
ditional generation to improve generated response’s coher-
ence. Specifically, we generate responses conditioned on the
above intermediate representation (intents and slots); (iii) Fi-
nally, we generate multiple responses with the nucleus sam-
pling strategy (Holtzman et al. 2019) and then apply a re-
sponse filter, which contains a set of pre-defined constraints
to select coherent responses. The constraints in the filter can
be defined according to specific task requirements or general
conversational rules.
To enrich publicly available non-collaborative task
datasets, we collect a new dataset ANTISCAM, where users
defend themselves against attackers trying to collect per-
sonal information. As non-collaborative tasks are still rela-
tively new to the study of dialog systems, there are insuf-
ficiently many meaningful datasets for evaluation and we
hope this provides a valuable example. We evaluate MISSA
on the newly collected ANTISCAM dataset and an exist-
ing PERSUASIONFORGOOD dataset. Both automatic and
human evaluations suggest that MISSA outperforms multi-
ple competitive baselines.
In summary, our contributions include: (i) We design a
hierarchical intent annotation scheme and a semantic slot
annotation scheme to annotate the non-collaborative dialog
dataset, we also propose a carefully-designed ANTISCAM
dataset to facilitate the research of non-collaborative dia-
log systems. (ii) We propose a model that can be applied
to all non-collaborative tasks, outperforming other baselines
on two different non-collaborative tasks. (iii) We develop an
anti-scam dialog system to occupy attacker’s attention and
elicit their private information for social good. Furthermore,
we also build a persuasion dialog system to persuade people
to donate to charities. We release the code and data.1
Related Work
The interest in non-collaborative tasks has been increasing
and there have already been several related datasets. For
instance, Wang et al. (2019) collected conversations where
one participant persuades another to donate to a charity. He
et al. (2018) collected negotiation dialogs where buyers
and sellers bargain for items for sale on Craigslist. There
are many other non-collaborative tasks, such as the turn-
taking game (DeVault, Mell, and Gratch 2015), the multi-
party game (Asher et al. 2016) and item splitting negoti-
ation (Potts 2012). Similar to the ANTISCAM dataset pro-
posed in this paper, these datasets contain off-task content
and can be used to train non-collaborative dialog systems.
However, since they are not specifically collected and de-
signed for non-collaborative tasks, it might be difficult to
disentangle the on-task and off-task contents and measure
the performance. Therefore, we propose the ANTISCAM
dataset, which is designed to interleave the on-task and off-
task contents in the conversation, and can serve as a bench-
mark dataset for similar non-collaborative tasks.
1https://gitlab.com/ucdavisnlp/antiscam
To better understand user utterances and separate on-
task and off-task content within a conversation, previous
work has designed hierarchical annotation schemes for spe-
cific domains. Hardy et al. (2002) followed the DAMSL
scheme(Allen and Core 1997) and annotated a multilingual
human-computer dialog corpus with a hierarchical dialog
act annotation scheme. Gupta et al. (2018) used a hierar-
chical annotation scheme for semantic parsing. Inspired by
these studies, our idea is to annotate the intent and seman-
tic slot separately in non-collaborative tasks. We propose a
hierarchical intent annotation scheme that can be adopted
by all non-collaborative tasks. With this annotation scheme,
MISSA is able to quickly build an end-to-end trainable dia-
log system for any non-collaborative task.
Traditional task-oriented dialog systems (Young et al.
2013) are usually composed of multiple independent mod-
ules, for example, natural language understanding, dialog
state tracking (Williams, Raux, and Henderson 2016; Mrksˇic´
et al. 2016), dialog policy manager (Levin, Pieraccini, and
Eckert 2000), and natural language generation (Lei et al.
2018). Conversational intent is adopted to capture the mean-
ing of task content in these dialog systems (He et al. 2018;
Zhao, Zhao, and Eskenazi 2017). In comparison to this
work, we use a hierarchical intent scheme that includes
off-task and on-task intents to capture utterance meaning.
We also train the model in a multi-task fashion to pre-
dict decoupled intents and semantic slots. The major de-
fect of a separately trained pipeline is the laborious dialog
state design and annotation. In order to mitigate this prob-
lem, recent work has explored replacing independent mod-
ules with end-to-end neural networks (Wen et al. 2016;
Williams, Asadi, and Zweig 2017; Liang et al. 2019). Our
model also follows this end-to-end fashion.
Over the last few years, we have witnessed a huge growth
in non-task-oriented dialog systems (Vinyals and Le 2015;
Li et al. 2016). Social chatbots such as Gunrock (Chen et
al. 2018) were able to maintain a conversation for around
ten minutes in an open domain. Recent improvements build
on top of the transformer and pre-trained language mod-
els (Devlin et al. 2018; Yang et al. 2019; Radford et al.
2019), obtained state-of-the-art results on the PERSONA-
CHAT dataset (Wolf et al. 2019). Pre-trained language mod-
els are proposed to build task-oriented dialog systems to
drive the progress on leveraging large amounts of available
unannotated data. (Budzianowski and Vulic´ 2019). Simi-
larly, our approach is also built on top of the Transfer-
Transfo framework (Wolf et al. 2019). Budzianowski and
Vulic´ (2019) focused on collaborative tasks (Budzianowski
et al. 2018). We target non-collaborative tasks instead.
Another line of work interleaves on-task and off-task
content by building a hybrid dialog system that combines
a task-oriented model and a non-task-oriented model (Yu,
Black, and Rudnicky 2017; Papaioannou et al. 2017). In
these studies, task-oriented systems and non-task-oriented
systems are designed separately and both systems generate
candidate responses. A selector is then designed to choose
an appropriate output from the candidate responses (Yu,
Black, and Rudnicky 2017) and a connector to combine two
response candidates (Zhao, Romero, and Rudnicky 2018;
Baheti et al. 2018). Compared with these works, MISSA is
end-to-end trainable and thus easier to train and update.
On-task
ANTISCAM
elicitation
providing information
refusal
agree donation
disagree donation
disagree donation more
ask donation amount
PERSUASION- ask donate more
-FORGOOD proposition of donation
er confirm donation
ee confirm donation
provide donation amount
Off-task
open question
yes no question
negative answer
positive answer
responsive statement
nonresponsive statement
greeting
thanking
respond to thank
apology
closing
hold
Table 1: Hierarchical intent annotation scheme on both AN-
TISCAM dataset and PERSUASIONFORGOOD dataset. The
On-task intents are task-specific while the Off-task intents
are general for different non-collaborative tasks.
Non-Collaborative Task Annotation Scheme
To decouple syntactic and semantic information in utter-
ances and provide detailed supervision, we design a hierar-
chical intent annotation scheme for non-collaborative tasks.
We first separate on-task and off-task intents. As on-task in-
tents are key actions that can vary among different tasks, we
need to specifically define on-task intents for each task. On
the other hand, since off-task content is too general to de-
sign task-specific intents, we choose common dialog acts as
the categories. The advantage of this hierarchical annotation
scheme is apparent when starting a new non-collaborative
task: we only need to focus on designing the on-task cate-
gories and semantic slots which are the same as traditional
task-oriented dialog systems. Consequently, we don’t have
to worry about the off-task annotation design since the off-
task category is universal.
In the intent annotation scheme shown in Table 1, we
list the designed intent annotation scheme for the newly
collected ANTISCAM dataset and the PERSUASIONFOR-
GOOD dataset. We first define on-task intents for the
datasets, which are key actions in the task. Since our AN-
TISCAM focuses on understanding and reacting towards
elicitations, we define elicitation, providing information
and refusal as on-task intents. In the PERSUASIONFOR-
GOOD dataset, we define nine on-task intents in Table 1
based on the original PERSUASIONFORGOOD dialog act
annotation scheme. All these intents are related to do-
nation actions, which are salient on-task intents in the
persuasion task. The off-task intents are the same for
both tasks, including six general intents and six additional
social intents. General intents are more closely related
to the syntactic meaning of the sentence (open question,
yes no question, positive answer, negative answer, respon-
sive statement, and nonresponsive statement) while social
intents are common social actions (greeting, closing, apol-
ogy, thanking,respond to thank, and hold).
For specific tasks, we also design a semantic slot an-
notation scheme for annotating sentences based on their
semantic content. We identify 13 main semantic slots in
the anti-scam task, for example, credit card numbers. We
present a detailed semantic slot annotation in Table 2. Fol-
lowing Wang et al., we segment each conversation turn into
single sentences and then annotate each sentence rather than
turns.
Annotation Examples
order detail “Your order will arrive by Thursday afternoon.”
order update “Should I cancel your order?”
payment “Was payment made with a Visa card?”
name “Can you give me your name?”
identity “I am from Amazon customer service.”
address “Can confirm your billing address for me?”
phone num “What is your phone number?”
card info “I need the credit card info please”
card num “Can you verify your card number for me?”
card cvs “Next, I will need the CVS number from that card.”
card date “Can I have expiration date?”
account detail “This is to confirm your account.”
others “How are you doing?”
Table 2: ANTISCAM’s semantic slot annotation scheme.
Datasets
We test our approach on two non-collaborative task datasets:
the ANTISCAM dataset and the PERSUASIONFORGOOD
dataset (Wang et al. 2019). Both datasets are collected from
the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform in the form of typing
conversations and off-task dialog is interleaved in the dialog.
ANTISCAM Dataset
To enrich available non-collaborative task datasets, we cre-
ated a corpus of human-human anti-scam dialogs in order
to learn human elicitation strategies. We chose a popular
Amazon customer service scam scenario to collect dialogs
between users and attackers who aim to collect users infor-
mation. We posted a role-playing task on the Amazon Me-
chanical Turk platform and collected a typing conversation
dataset named ANTISCAM. We collected 220 human-human
dialogs. The average conversation length is 12.45 turns and
the average utterance length is 11.13 words. Only 172 out of
220 users successfully identified their partner as an attacker,
suggesting that the attackers are well trained and not too
easily identifiable. We recruited two expert annotators who
have linguistic training to annotate 3,044 sentences in 100
dialogs, achieving a 0.874 averaged weighted kappa value.
PERSUASIONFORGOOD Dataset
The PERSUASIONFORGOOD dataset (Wang et al. 2019) was
collected from typing conversations on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk platform. Two workers were randomly paired, one
was assigned the role of persuader, the other was persuadee.
The goal of the persuader was to persuade the persuadee to
donate a portion of task earning to a specific charity. The
dataset consists of 1,017 dialogs, where 300 dialogs are an-
notated with dialog acts. The average conversation length is
10.43, the vocabulary size is 8,141. Since the original PER-
SUASIONFORGOOD dataset is annotated with dialog acts,
we select the on-task dialog acts as on-task intents shown
in Table 1, and categorize the other dialog acts into our pre-
defined off-task intents.
Model
Background
The TransferTransfo framework was proposed to build open
domain dialog systems. Wolf et al. (2019) fine-tuned the
generative pre-training model (GPT) (Radford et al. 2018)
with the PERSONA-CHAT dataset (Zhang et al. 2018) in
a multi-task fashion, where the language model objective is
combined with a next-utterance classification task. The lan-
guage model’s objective is to maximize the following likeli-
hood for a given sequence of tokens, X = {x1, . . . , xn}:
LLM (X) =
n∑
i=1
logP (xi|x0, . . . , xi−1) (1)
The authors also trained a classifier to distinguish the cor-
rect next-utterance appended to the input human utterances
from a set of randomly selected utterance distractors. In ad-
dition, they introduced dialog state embeddings to indicate
speaker role in the model. The model significantly outper-
formed previous baselines over both automatic evaluations
and human evaluations in social conversations. Since the
TransferTransfo framework performs well in open domain,
we adapt it for non-collaborative settings. We keep all the
embeddings in the framework and train the language model
and next-utterance classification task in a multi-task fashion
following TransferTransfo.
We make two major changes: (1) To address the problem
that TransferTransfo is originally designed for an open do-
main without explicit intents and regulations, we add two
intent classifiers and two semantic slot classifiers to clas-
sify the intents and semantic slots for both human utterances
and system responses as an effort to incorporate the pro-
posed hierarchical intent and semantic slot annotation for
non-collaborative tasks. (2) In dialog systems, multiple gen-
erated responses can be coherent under the current context.
Generating diverse responses has proven to be an enduring
challenge. To increase response diversity, we sample multi-
ple generated responses and choose an appropriate one ac-
cording to a set of pre-defined rules.
Intent and Semantic Slot Classifiers
We train MISSA in a multi-task fashion. In addition to the
language model task and the next-utterance prediction task,
we also use separate classifiers to predict the intents and se-
mantic slots of both human utterances and system responses.
The intent classifier and semantic slot classifier for human
utterances capture the semantic and syntactic meaning of
human utterances, providing information to select the appro-
priate response among response candidates while the classi-
fiers for the system intents and semantic slots are designed
to help select an appropriate next-sentence. We describe re-
sponse filtering in the corresponding subsection. Classifiers
are designed as the following equation:
p(Lit) = softmax(
[
hlt−1
hit
]
·W2h) (2)
where Lit is the intent or semantic label of i-th sentence at
turn t. hlt−1 is the hidden states at the end of last sentence
in turn t − 1, hit is the last hidden states at the end of i-th
sentence in turn t. W2h are weights learned during training.
MISSA is able to classify multiple intents and multiple se-
mantic slots in a single utterance with these classifiers. Fig-
ure 1 shows how it works on the ANTISCAM dataset. Specif-
ically, we set a special token <sep> at the end of each sen-
tence in an utterance (an utterance can consist of multiple
sentences). Next, we pass the token’s position information
to the transformer architecture and obtain the representation
of the position (represented as colored position at last layer
in Figure 1). After that, we concatenate the embeddings at
these position with the hidden states of last sentence. We
pass these concatenated representations to the intent classi-
fier and the slot classifier to obtain an intent and a semantic
slot for each sentence in the utterance. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the loss function L for the model combines all the
task losses:
L =λLMLLM + λIhLIh + λShLSh + λIsLIs
+ λSsLSs + λnupLnup
(3)
where LLM is the language model loss, LIh , LSh , LIs , andLSs are losses of intent and slots classifiers, Lnup is next-
utterance classification loss. λLM , λIh , λSh , λIs , λSs , and
λnup are the hyper-parameters that control the relative im-
portance of every loss.
Response Generation
MISSA can generate multiple sentences in a single system
turn. Therefore, we perform system generation conditioned
on predicted system intents. More specifically, during the
training phase, in addition to inserting a special <sep> to-
ken at the end of each sentence, we also insert the intent of
the system response as special tokens at the head of each
sentence in the system response. For example, in Figure 1,
we insert a <pos ans> token at the head of S1t , which is the
system response in green. We then use a cross entropy loss
function to calculate the loss between the predicted token
and the ground truth intent token. During the testing phase,
the model first generates a special intent token, then after
⨁
Private Information (Pi)
Your name is  <name>.
Your phone number is <phone>.
Your address is <addr>.
Your credit card number is <ccnum>
Your credit card CVS is <cvs> 
Sys: Hello, what can I do for you?
Human: Hello, this is Amazon customer Service.
Dialog History
⨁
Sys: Thank you!
System Response(St)
Distractor (D)
"#t$I (Ht1): responsive_stm$I (Ht2): yes_no_question
Human Intents 
Classifier
OR
Pi Ht-1 St-1       <sep>
<sep> <sep> <sep> <sep> <eos>
Transformer
"S (Ht1): order_detail"S (Ht2): order_detail "S (St1): order_detail"S (St2): order_detail$I (St1): positive_answer$I (St2): non_responsive_stm
Decoder
System Response
Last layer 
Hidden states
Human Slots 
Classifier
System Intents 
Classifier
System Slots 
Classifier
Next Utterance 
Classifier
Human: I am investigating a fraudulent purchase.      (Ht1)
Have you placed a recent order?                    (Ht2)
Ht1  <sep> Ht2 <sep>
Sys: Yes, I have.               (St1)
I bought a heater.  (St2)
<pos_ans>  St1  <sep> <no_rsp_stm> St2   <eos>
Figure 1: The training phase overview of MISSA on ANTISCAM dataset, the input consists of three parts: private information,
dialog history, and an appended next utterance. We concatenate the last hidden states at <sep> tokens with the last hidden
states at the end of the last utterance to predict intents and semantic slots for corresponding sentences. We can predict multiple
intents and semantic slots for each human utterance and system response. During testing, the appended response and distractor
are removed.
being conditioned on this intent token, the model keeps gen-
erating a sentence until it generates a <sep> token. After
that, the model continues to generate another intent token
and another sentence until it generates an <eos> token.
Response Filtering
Since we only perform conditional generation, a type of soft
constraint on the predicted intent of system response, the
system can still generate samples that violate simple con-
versation regulations, such as eliciting information that has
already been provided. These corner cases may lead to fatal
results in high-risk tasks, for example, health care and edu-
cation. To improve the robustness of MISSA and improve its
ability to generalize to more tasks, we add a response filter-
ing module after the generation. With the nucleus sampling
strategy (Holtzman et al. 2019), MISSA is able to gener-
ate multiple diverse candidate responses with different in-
tents and semantic slots. We then adopt a task-specific re-
sponse filtering policy to choose the best candidate response
as the final output. In our anti-scam scenario, we set up a
few simple rules to filter out some unreasonable candidates,
for instance, eliciting the repeated information. The filtering
module is easily adaptable to different domains or specific
requirements, which makes our dialog system more control-
lable.
Experiments
We evaluate MISSA on two non-collaborative task datasets.
ANTISCAM aims to build a dialog system that occupies
the attacker’s attention and elicits the attacker’s information
while PERSUASIONFORGOOD (Wang et al. 2019) aims to
build a dialog system that persuades people to donate to a
charity. We use 80% data for training, 10% data for vali-
dation, and 10% data for testing. More training details are
presented in Appendix.
Baseline Models
We compare MISSA mainly with two baseline models:
• TransferTransfo The vanilla TransferTransfo framework
is compared with MISSA to show the impact and neces-
sity of adding the intent and slot classifiers. We follow
the original TransferTransfo design (Wolf et al. 2019) and
train with undelexicalized data.
• Hybrid Following Yu, Black, and Rudnicky (2017), we
also build a hybrid dialog system by combining vanilla
TransferTransfo and MISSA. Specifically, we first deter-
mine if the human utterances are on-task or off-task with
human intent classifier. If the classifier decides that the ut-
terance is on-task, we choose the response from MISSA;
otherwise, we choose the response from vanilla Transfer-
Transfo baseline.
In addition, we perform ablation studies on MISSA to show
the effects of different components.
• MISSA-sel denotes MISSA without response filtering.
• MISSA-con denotes MISSA leaving out the intent token
at the start of the response generation.
Automatic Evaluation Metrics
Perplexity Since the canonical measure of a good language
model is perplexity, which indicates the error rate of the ex-
Automatic Evaluation Metrics Human Evaluation Metrics
Model PPL RIP RSP ERIP ERSP Fluency Coherence Engagement Length TaskSuc
TransferTransfo 32.96 34.8% 46.0% 48.0% 56.3% 3.48 2.85 2.68 8.5 1.025
Hybrid - 32.0% 44.0% 45.7% 55.3% 3.25 2.76 2.60 8.2 0.975
MISSA 21.07 35.1% 46.6% 47.2% 58.6% 4.18 3.75 3.69 14.9 1.294
MISSA-sel 30.54 31.6% 42.4% 44.2% 53.8% 3.60 2.92 2.87 9.9 1.000
MISSA-con 24.46 33.8% 45.6% 46.0% 57.3% 3.78 3.68 3.78 14.8 1.341
Table 3: Experiments results with both automatic and human evaluation on ANTISCAM dataset.
pected word. We choose perplexity to evaluate the model
performance.
Response-Intent Prediction (RIP) & Response-Slot Pre-
diction (RSP) Different from open-domain dialog systems,
we care about the intents of the system response in non-
collaborative tasks as we hope to know if the system re-
sponse satisfies user intents. For example, in the anti-scam
task, if the attacker elicits information from the system, we
need to know if the system refuses or agrees to provide the
information. Therefore we care about intent prediction for
the generated system response. Since our baselines are more
suited for social chat as they cannot produce system intents,
we use the system intent and slot classifiers trained in our
model to predict their responses’ intents and slots. The in-
tent predictor achieves a 84% accuracy and the semantic slot
predictor achieves 77% on the ANTISCAM dataset. Then we
compare the predicted values with human-annotated ground
truth in the dataset to compute the response-intent prediction
(RIP) and response-slot prediction (RSP).
Extended Response-Intent Prediction (ERIP) & Ex-
tended Response-Slot Prediction (ERSP) With Response-
Intent Prediction, we verify the predicted intents to evalu-
ate the coherence of the dialog. However, the real mapping
between human-intent and system-intent is much more com-
plicated as there might be multiple acceptable system-intents
for the same human-intent. Therefore, we also design a met-
ric to evaluate if the predicted system-intent is in the set of
acceptable intents. Specifically, we estimate the transition
probability p(Ii|Ij) by counting the frequency of all the bi-
gram human-intent and system-intent pairs in the training
data. During the test stage, if the predicted intent matches
the ground truth, we set the score as 1, otherwise we set the
score as p(Ipredict|Ii) where Ii is the intent of the input hu-
man utterance. We then report the average value of those
scores over turns as the final extended response-intent pre-
diction result.
Human Evaluation Metrics
Automatic metrics only validate the systems performance on
a single dimension at a time. The ultimate holistic evalua-
tion should be conducted by having the trained system in-
teract with human users. Therefore we also conduct human
evaluations for the dialog system built on ANTISCAM. We
test our models and baselines with 15 college-student volun-
teers. Each of them is asked to pretend to be an attacker and
interact with all the models for at least three times to avoid
randomness. We in total collect 225 number of dialogs. Each
time, volunteers are required to use similar sentences and
strategies to interact with all five models and score each
model based on the metrics listed below at the end of the
current round. Each model receives a total of 45 human rat-
ings, and the average score is reported as the final human-
evaluation score. In total, we design five different metrics to
assess the models’ conversational ability whilst interacting
with humans. The results are shown in Table 3.
Fluency Fluency is used to explore different models’ lan-
guage generation quality.
Coherence Different from single sentence’s fluency, coher-
ence focuses more on the logical consistency between sen-
tences in each turn.
Engagement In the anti-scam scenario, one of our missions
is to keep engaging with the attackers to waste their time. So
we directly ask volunteers (attackers) to what extend they
would like to continue chatting with the system.
Dialog length (Length) Engagement is a subjective metric.
Anti-scam system’s goal is to engage user in the conversa-
tion longer in order to limit their harm to other potential
victims. So we count the dialog length as another metric to
evaluate system performance.
Task Success Score (TaskSuc) The other goal of the anti-
scam system is to elicit attacker’s personal information. We
count the average type of information (name, address and
phone number) that the system obtained from attackers as
the task success score.
Results and Analysis
Table 3 presents the main experiment results on ANTIS-
CAM dataset, for both automatic evaluation metrics and hu-
man evaluation metrics. The experiment results on PER-
SUASIONFORGOOD are shown in Table 5. We observe that
MISSA outperforms two baseline models (TransferTransfo
and hybrid model) on almost all the metrics on both datasets.
For further analysis, examples of real dialogs from the hu-
man evaluation are presented in Table 4.
Compared to the first TransferTransfo baseline, MISSA
outperforms the TransferTransfo baseline on the on-task
contents. From Table 3, we observe that MISSA maintains
longer conversations (14.9 turns) compared with Transfer-
Transfo (8.5 turns), which means MISSA is better at main-
taining the attacker’s engagement. MISSA also has a higher
task success score (1.294) than TransferTransfo (1.025),
which indicates that it elicits information more strategically.
In the top two dialogs (A and B) that are shown in Table 4,
both attackers were eliciting a credit card number in their
first turns. TransferTransfo directly gave away the informa-
(A) Att: Attacker System: TransferTransfo (B) Att: Attacker System: MISSA
Att: Can I have your card number?
Sys: 5110-xxxx-xxxx-8166
Att: Got it. I also need the billing address
Sys: What is your name? My name is Tom.
Att: I am Jerry, as I mentioned before. I need your address
to proceed the refund.
Sys: What is the phone number there?
Att: Could you give me your phone number?
Att: Can I have your card number?
Sys: Why would you need my credit card number?
Att: I can track your order easily.
Sys: Why can’t you use my address?
Att: Well, both of them are needed.
Sys: Alright, it is 5110-xxxx-xxxx-8166. May I have your
number in case we disconnect?
Att: xxx-xxx-xxxx
(C) Att: Attacker System: Hybrid (D) Att: Attacker System: MISSA
Att: Hi, my name is Jerry.
Sys: Hello, who is this?
...
Sys: Why do you need my address?
Att: I need your address to verify your order.
Sys: I don’t have my order number with me. Why do you
need my order number to verify my order?
Att: Hi, my name is Jerry.
Sys: Hi, Jerry. what are you calling me about?
...
Sys: Why do you need my address?
Att: I need your address to verify your order.
Sys: You should have it on file already
Table 4: Examples of human-system dialogs, where systems are trained on ANTISCAM dataset. System responses are bolded.
tion, while MISSA replied with a semantically-related ques-
tion “why would you need my credit card number?” Further-
more, in the next turn, TransferTransfo ignored the context
and asked an irrelevant question “what is your name?” while
MISSA was able to generate the response “why can’t you
use my address?”, which is consistent to the context. We
suspect the improved performance of MISSA comes from
our proposed annotation scheme: the semantic slot informa-
tion enables MISSA to keep track of the current entities, and
the intent information helps MISSA to maintain coherency
and prolong conversations.
Compared to the hybrid model baseline, MISSA performs
better on off-task content. As shown in the bottom two di-
alogs in Table 4, attackers in both dialogs introduced their
names in their first utterances. MISSA recognized attacker’s
name, while the hybrid model did not. We suspect it is be-
cause the hybrid model does not have the built-in semantic
slot predictor. In the second turn, both attackers were ex-
plaining the reason of requesting the billing address previ-
ously. With semantic slot information, MISSA can easily un-
derstand the attacker; but the hybrid model misunderstands
that the attacker was talking about the order number, pos-
sibly because the token “order” appeared in the attacker’s
utterance. We suspect that the hybrid model’s bad perfor-
mance on the off-task content leads to its low coherence rat-
ing (2.76) and short dialog length (8.2).
To explore the influence of the intent-based conditional
response generation method and the designed response filter,
we perform an ablation study. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3. We find that MISSA has higher fluency score and co-
herence score than MISSA-con (4.18 vs 3.78 for fluency, and
3.75 vs 3.68 for coherence), which suggests that condition-
ing on the system intent to generate responses improves the
quality of the generated sentences. Compared with MISSA-
sel, MISSA achieves better performance on all the metrics.
For example, the engagement score for MISSA is 3.69 while
MISSA-sel only has 2.87. This is because the response fil-
ter removed all the incoherent responses, which makes the
attacker more willing to keep chatting. The ablation study
shows both the conditional language generation mechanism
and the response filter are essential to MISSA’s good perfor-
mance.
We also apply our method to the PERSUASIONFORGOOD
dataset. As shown in Table 5, MISSA and its variants outper-
form the TransferTransfo and the hybrid models on all evalu-
ation metrics. Such good performance indicates MISSA can
be easily applied to a different non-collaborative task and
achieve good performance. Particularly, MISSA achieves
the lowest perplexity, which confirms that using conditional
response generation leads to high quality responses. Com-
pared with the result on ANTISCAM dataset, MISSA-con
performs the best in terms of RIP and ERIP. We suspect the
underlying reason is that there are more possible responses
with the same intent in PERSUASIONFORGOOD than in AN-
TISCAM. This also suggests that we should adjust the model
structure according to the nature of the dataset.
Model PPL RIP ERIP
TransferTransfo 26.37 41.9% 48.0%
Hybrid - 37.3% 44.1%
MISSA 19.91 43.1% 51.6%
MISSA-sel 24.00 42.0% 48.9%
MISSA-con 20.43 43.8% 52.6%
Table 5: Automatic evaluation results on PERSUASIONFOR-
GOOD dataset.
Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a general dialog system pipeline to build non-
collaborative dialog systems, including a hierarchical an-
notation scheme and an end-to-end neural response gener-
ation model called MISSA. With the hierarchical annota-
tion scheme, we can distinguish on-task and off-task intents.
MISSA takes both on and off-task intents as supervision in
its training and thus can deal with diverse user utterances in
Instructions for the attacker
Your name is Norman Paul.
Your phone number is 800-xxx-8892
Your location is 2100 Kings ct, x City, x State, xxxxx (Zipcode)
You are a hacker and you want to get others’ information as much as possible.
You are pretending to be an Amazon Customer Service staff.
You want him/her to tell you his/her card number, CVS number on the card, expire date, name and billing address etc.
The information of the other person you have already known:
His name is Jim Lee.
He bought something on Amazon.com.
You may get a bonus if you get his credit card information successfully.
Instructions for the user
Your name is Jim Lee.
Your credit card number is 5110-xxxx-xxxx-8166
Your CVS number of credit card is 380
Your credit card expire date is 05/25
Your phone number is 350-xxx-2988
Your billing address is xxx El Ave, Apt 311, City, State, Zipcode
You bought a heater on Amazon.com and it has not arrived.
Now you get a phone call from an unknown number
Stage1:
You respond to the other person ordinarily.
After several turns, you need to judge if the other person is an attacker. If you think he/she is an attacker, go to stage2. Otherwise,
you stay at stage1.
Stage2:
You are not supposed to give your information to him/her.
You are trying to get his/her information as mush as possible, including name, phone number, location, etc.
If you can not get his/her information, try to talk with him/her and waste his/her time as long as possible.
You may get a bonus if you can get his information correctly.
Table 6: Instructions for attackers and users on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
non-collaborative settings. Moreover, to validate MISSA’s
performance, we create a non-collaborate dialog dataset that
focuses on deterring phone scammers. MISSA outperforms
all baseline methods in terms of fluency, coherency, and user
engagement on both the newly proposed anti-scam task and
an existing persuasion task. However, MISSA still produces
responses that are not consistent with their distant conver-
sation history as GPT can only track a limited history span.
In future work, we plan to address this issue by developing
methods that can effectively track longer dialog context.
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Appendix
Anti-Scam Collection Setting
We randomly pair two workers: one is assigned the role of
the attacker to elicit user information, and the other one is
assigned the role of an everyday user who aims to protect
her/his information and potentially elicit the attacker’s in-
formation. We give both workers specific personal data. In-
structions are shown in Table 6. The “attacker” additionally
receives training on how to elicit information from people.
Workers cannot see their partners’ instructions.
There are two tasks for the users: firstly, users are required
to chat with their partners and determine if they are attack-
ers or not, reporting their decisions at the end of the task.
If users think their partners are attackers, they are instructed
to prolong the conversation and elicit information from their
partners. We give a bonus to users if they detect the attack-
ers and elicit real information from the attackers, including
the attacker’s name, address and phone number. Since one
worker can only participate once in the task, they do not
know their partners are always attackers.
We provide real user information including the user’s
name and the task background (user purchased a product
on Amazon) . Attackers are well-trained to pretend to be an
Amazon customer service agent. To simulate a real-world
scam, we tell attackers some details about the user, such as
the user’s name to stop them from being too easily identified.
We give a bonus to attackers if they elicit correct information
from users, including the user’s address, credit card number,
CVS and expiration date. Each worker can only participate
once to prevent workers from knowing their partner’s in-
formation and goals in advance. We collected 220 human-
human dialogs. The average conversation length is 12.45
turns and the average utterance length is 11.13 words. Only
172 out of 220 users successfully identified their partner as
an attacker, suggesting that the attackers are well trained and
not too easily identifiable.
Role Sentences Intent Semantic Slot
Attacker Hi. greeting others
Attacker I’m <name> with Amazon’s Distribution Center. greeting name
User Hello <name> I’m <name> how are you today? greeting name
Attacker I’m doing very well, thank you for asking. greeting others
Attacker How did you enjoy your recent Amazon purchase? open question order detail
User Well I’m very excited to use it, it hasnt seemed to arrive just yet responsive statement order ship
Attacker May I please have you verify a few pieces of account information to
better assist you?
yes no question account detail
User Yes but first can you tell me where the package was shipped to. positive answer address
Attacker What is the name and billing address on the account for this order? elicitation address
User <name>. providing info name
User I forgot the address, I don’t know which vacation home its for refusal address
Attacker I just need the billing address for now. elicitation address
Attacker Then I can verify the address of the shipment. non responsive statement address
User I can’t remember. refusal address
User Can I call you back with it? elicitation phone number
Attacker I can look this information up with your payment info if that’s easier. non responsive statement payment
User No, but I’ll call you after I ask my wife. responsive statement address
User What’s the best number to reach you? elicitation phone number
Attacker Sure. hold others
Attacker It is <phone>. providing info phone number
Attacker Thank you Mr.<name>. thanking others
User the address is in <addr>. providing info address
User try and see if thats enough info non responsive statement others
Attacker Is this the city and state for the billing address, sir? yes no question address
User Yes it is. positive answer address
User Where is my package right now? open question order ship
User the tracking number won’t work. non responsive statement order ship
Attacker The tracking # I have on file is 2343reesr. responsive statement order ship
Attacker Is this correct? yes no question order ship
User yes it is! positive answer order ship
User How many days until the heater arrives? open question order ship
Attacker It is being delayed due to bad weather. responsive statement order ship
User Alright, So where are you calling from? elicitation address
User I want to praise your customer service! non responsive statement address
Attacker I am in <addr>. providing info address
Attacker Would you like a replacement sent to you sooner? yes no question order update
User would it be at any extra charge? yes no question payment
System: Do you think your partner worker is an attacker? User: Yes
Table 7: An example human-human dialog in ANTISCAM dataset. All the slot values have been replaced with slot tokens.
We recruited two expert annotators who have linguistic
training to annotate 3,044 sentences in 100 dialogs, achiev-
ing a 0.874 averaged weighted kappa value. Table 1 shows
that there is a vast amount of off-task content in the dataset,
which confirms the necessity of a hierarchical on-task/off-
task annotation scheme. We observe that sentences from
the attacker and user have different intent distributions.
Compared to attackers, users produce more refusal (74 vs
19), because users are more likely to refuse to provide re-
quested information if they have detected the attacker. More-
over, users also ask more open questions (173 vs 54) and
yes no questions (165 vs 117) for off-task content because
they are instructed to prolong the conversation after detect-
ing the attacker. Furthermore, attackers and users both have
a massive amount of social content (292 in total and 252 in
total), suggesting that it is important to have social intent
sentences to maintain the conversation.
Training details
MISSA is based on the generative pre-trained trans-
former (Radford et al. 2018). We use an Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 6.25e-5 and L2 weight decay of 0.01,
we set the coefficient of language modeling loss to be 2, the
coefficient of intent and slot classifiers to be 1, and the coef-
ficient of next-utterance classifier to be 1. We first pre-train
the model on the PERSONA-CHAT dataset. When fine-
tuning on the ANTISCAM and the PERSUASIONFORGOOD
datasets, we use 80% data for training, 10% data for vali-
dation, and 10% data for testing. Since the original PER-
SUASIONFORGOOD dataset is annotated with intents, we
separate the original on-task and off-task intents, which are
shown in Table 1. To deal with the words out of the vocabu-
lary, we conduct delexicalization to replace slot values with
corresponding slot tokens during the training phase, and re-
place the slot tokens with pre-defined information during
testing.
Example Dialog
An example of human-human chat on ANTISCAM dataset is
shown in Table 7.
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